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Introduction
An important goal of economic theory is to understand what allocation mechanisms, or institutions, are best suited to minimize the economic losses generated by private information. Asymmetric information are a typical problems in the asset and liability management of banking firms.
1 When will a market mechanism suffice to allocate resources efficiently? As it turned out, the market implements efficient outcomes only under very stringent conditions. The basic problem is that borrowers have an incentive to economize with their private information. To overcome this problem a collateral offered by a borrower is often viewed as a credible signal of the riskiness of the project. Signaling with collateral seems to be an efficient procedure of information transmission. This paper challenges this view. We argue that under regular conditions there is no way to convey private information by the collateral amount offered by a borrower and hence there is no way to derive a separating equilibirum. In general, our model is characterized either by a pooling equilibrium or no equilibrium at all.
For the most part, a bank's lending decision takes place in an asymmetric information environment. Typically, the bank is the information outsider and the borrower is the information insider. In order to overcome the information gap, signaling activities do help to convey information to the bank. Because of his insider status the borrower knows the probability distribution of his projects cash flow with certainty. The bank does not know these details. All the bank knows by assumption is that the borrowers project quality is either a low risk or a high risk. A signaling process is bound to identify the members of different classes. The existing literature is able to proof that a financial contract using collateral as a signal is able to overcome the asymmetric information problem and separate the borrowers.
2 In contrast to this position, we are going to demonstrate that there is no way for collaterals to convey valuable information from the information insider to the outsider.
In our paper, we challenge this result. According to our reasoning collateral is not in a position to overcome the informational asymmetry. The reason is that we are no longer arguing in a world with only two outcomes. In the papers mentioned above there are only two outcomes existing. Based on this assumption the authors are in a position to show that signaling matters.
In contrast, we are going to analyse the problem in a world with a continuum of outcomes. This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the standard model and the role of collateral in credit markets with asymmetric information. The perfect Bayesian equilibrium is developed in section 3. In section 4 we demonstrate the impossibility of a separating equilibrium with collateral. Section 5 contains concluding remarks.
The model
In this section we are going to discuss the basic structure of a signaling contract. For example, the collateral offered by a borrower can be considered as a signal of the unobservable degree of riskiness of the entrepreneur's project. As confirmed in banking models the unobservable quality is revealed by an observable action. A perfectly revealing signal enables the information outsider to infer on the a priori knowledge of the information insider.
Bank credit analysts have typically referred to collateral as an important factor to predict a borrowers default probability. In order to overcome the basic informational asymmetry the logic of a signaling contract can be explained as follows. A borrower with a high risk project has a great aversion to putting up collateral because he knows about the great probability of loosing it. Exploiting this property, the banker can offer the borrower two alternative contracts: a secured loan and a unsecured loan. In a signaling contract, each amount of collateral is linked to one and only one loan rate or repayment obligation. If the combination of collateral and loan rate is properly designed the borrower has an incentive to choose exactly the contract that is intended for his type of riskiness. This process is called self selecting or truth revealing.
There are different instruments available to set up a signaling contract, i.e. loan size, collateral, maturity, covenants. Mostly, the existing literature is able to proof and confirm the separating solution. The purpose of our paper is to prove that this result is true only under very restrictive assumptions.
The following assumptions about the lender-borrower relationship are considered in our model. There are two risk neutral decision makers, a bank B and an entreprenuer, E, i.e. the borrower. The bank is an information outsider and the borrower is the information insider. Two different classes of borrowers exist: borrowers of class z 1 have a low risk project; borrowers of class z 2 have a high risk project. The bank knows this but is unable to tell who is who. From past experience the the proportions of the risk classes are know; class z 1 occurs with λ% and class z 2 occurs with (1 − λ)% and 0 < λ < 1.
The cash flow of type z i is a nonnegative random variable x with a density f (x; z i ) and cumulative distribution function F (x; z i ) for i = 1, 2. The expected values x are identical. For both types the maximum cash flow is S with 0 < S < ∞. In addition, we assume f (x;
The riskiness of both types is defined as follows: type z 1 exhibits second order stochastic dominance (SSD) over type z 2 :
Both types exhibit an identical initial project outlay l which is exogenously given, assuming l < x. The signaling contract is characterized by the collateral c and repayment obligation L with with c ≤l, wherel is any pre-specified number 0 <l < l.
The operating cash flows of the project are assigned to the bank and to the borrower contingent on the different states of the world. The borrower is in a position to repay the predetermined obligation or, alternatively, he/she is not able to do so. The sources of the repayment are the projects cash flow on the one hand and the liquidation cash flow of the collateral c on the other hand, that is x + c. If the cash flow is sufficiently large to permit the repayment, the borrower will do so. Thus, the bank receives the full amount of the predetermined repayment. The residual amount goes to the borrower. If the project's cash flow is not sufficient, the bank takes all available cash flows leaving the borrower with a loss of his collateral.
Indicating the banks and the borrower's cash flow by u B and u E , respectively, and the definition ofx = L − c, we find:
From cash flows we obtain the expected net cash flow of the bank, R, and the borrower, P , respectively:
The expected cash flows R(c, L; z i ) and P (c, L; z i ) sum up to the expected value of the projects operating cash flows:
The perfect Bayesian equilibrium
The equilibrium concept employed is the perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE).
The collateral amounts accepted by borrowers of both risk classes are denoted by c * 1 and c * 2 , respectively. The term * indicates the banks beliefs on the borrower risk class. Depending on the amounts c * 1 and c * 2 , the bank is in a position to revise its beliefs (c). In other words, (c) ∈ [0, 1] is the probability as seen by the bank that the borrower is a z 1 type (low risk) and (1 − (c)) is the proability of a z 2 type (high risk). Now we discuss in detail the signaling contract. The bank designs signaling contracts by combining alternative repayment obligations L with alternative amounts of collateral c ≤l. The lender can offer a menu of loan contracts based on the bank's beliefs (c) contingent on the class z i . Therefore the expected net payoff of the bank is given by
We define the expected gross payoff of a type z i borrower by
Assuming a competitive banking industry the banks expected profit is driven down to zero. Hence the contract {c, L} satisfies the zeroprofit condition
In order to derive the properties of the signaling contract we calculate the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between L and c. The MRS is the absolute value of the slope of the indifference curves in the (c, L)-diagram.
It will be shown below that the indifference curve of a prespecified class z i is strictly decreasing and strictly convex. The relevant interval is [0,l] Proof The indifference curve of type i borrower at level α is given by (c, L) :
Let F 1 and F 2 denote the partial derivative of F with respect to c and L, respectively. We get the following expression for the slope of the α-curve
From the discussion we obtain the following Corollary The indifference curves of borrowers are strictly monotonously decreasing.
Proposition 2 The indifference curves of borrowers are strictly convex in
Proof Assume the contrary to the claim that there is a c
)−c and noticing that
Thus, we wind up with L 2 (c) = l+ 
The claim has been proven.
Properties of the solutions
In this section we are going to discuss two different cases in order to prove
There is a separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) (σ,μ) witĥ for the type z 2 borrower to choose the contract characterized byĉ 1 instead ofĉ 2 . Given this choice the type z 2 borrower is in a position to improve his situation by achieving a higher indifference curve.
However, in (σ,μ) withσ = ((c 1 ,c 2 ),L(·)), withc 1 =c 2 =c =∈ [0,l] we find a pooling PBE ifL(·) is chosen in such a way that its graph is located above the indifference curve of type z 1 borrower and type z 2 borrower through the point (c,L(c)), illustrated by point A in Figure 1 .L is chosen in such a way that its graph is strictly above both indifference curves, apart from the point (c,L(c)).
The valueL(c) is given byL = L λ (c) with L λ being defined by the zero 
Such a situation is given if the low risk project is characterized by the smaller default probability of all loan contracts {c, L} with the exclusion of the full cover contract {l, L}, i.e., if p(c, L; z 1 ) < p(c, L; z 2 ) holds for all contracts with 0 ≤ c < l and l ≤ L < S. ForL(c) withc =l the zero profit condition, λR g (c,L(c);
The resulting pair (c,L(c)) = (l,L(l)) constitutes a pooling equilibrium. The reason is that the indifference of type z 1 borrower through (l,L(l)) does not intersect the graph of c → L 2 (c), i.e., type 2 line in Figure 1 . To this end, consider the indifference curve of type z 1 and type z 2 through (l,L(l)). Note that type z 1 's MRS, i.e. p(l,L(l) ; z 1 ))/1 − p (l,L(l) ; z 1 ), at that point is smaller than type z 2 's MRS, i.e. p (l,L(l) ; z 2 ))/1 − p (l,L(l) ; z 2 ), due to the assumption on the default probabilities. Note that type z 1 's indifference curve through (l,L(l)) is strictly below type z 2 's indifference curve through that point regarding the interval [0,l] , apart from the point (l,L(l)) of course, again due to the assumption on the default probabilities. This prevents an intersection from taking place. (ii) In B any pooling equilibrium is based onc
In this situation there is an incentive for type z i borrowers to unilaterally deviate from the original contract by choosing a collateralc ∈ [0,l] with L 1 (c) = L 2 (c) because there is a possibility to be better off. Note thatL(c) = L 1 (c) = L 2 (c) and L 1 (c) <L(c) <L 2 (c).
(iii) If there is a separating equilibrium, the type z i borrower can achieve an expected payoffx. The same payoff holds in case B for all perfect pooling equilibria. As a consequence, all equilibria in B are characterized by identical payoffs.
We summerize our findings in an impossibility
Theorem Given a continuum of outcomes of the borrowers risky investment and projects are classified by second order stochastic dominance. Then collaterals are no longer devices for screening heterogenous borrowers.
The proof follows from the above discussion.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we challenge basic results of signaling models in the credit market. In banking literature collateral is considered a very powerful instrument to convey valuable information from the borrower to the bank. As a result the bank is in a position to sort and classify its borrowers according to the degree of riskiness. A perequisite for this result is the introduction of some very strong and simplify assumptions. The most important assumption is a world with only two possible outcomes to the random cash flow.
In our model each risky project is described by a continous density of outcomes. Moreover, density functions are classified according to the concept of second order stochastic dominance. Combining these two features we find that collateral is no longer in a position to signal the unoberservable degree of riskness to the information outsider, i.e. the bank. As a result, a signaling contract is not able to sort and classify the borrowers. Under regular conditions there is hardly a way to derive a separating equilibrium in our model. In most cases the equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium. Alternatively, an equilibrium does not exist.
If there is no possibility to convey valuable information, the credit market is characterized by adverse selection and quantity rationing. Credit rationing will occure again. According to our analysis, there is no reason to be very optimistic with respect to the application of signaling concepts to banking issues. Generally speaking, many frictions and imperfections will continue to dominate the features of financial markets.
